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The Good, The Bad and the Discriminator –
Errors in direct and indirect reciprocity
Hannelore Brandt and Karl Sigmund
April 28, 2005
Abstract
This paper presents, in a series of simple diagrams, con-
cise results about the replicator dynamics of direct and indi-
rect reciprocity. We consider repeated interactions between
donors and recipients, and analyse the relationship between
three basic strategies for the donor: unconditional coop-
eration, all-out defection, and conditional cooperation. In
other words, we investigate the competition of discriminat-
ing and undiscriminating altruists with defectors. Discrimi-
nators and defectors form a bistable community, and hence
a population of discriminators cannot be invaded by defec-
tors. But unconditional altruists can invade a discriminat-
ing population and ’soften it up’ for a subsequent invasion
by defectors. The resulting dynamics exhibits various forms
of rock-paper-scissors cycles and depends in subtle ways on
noise, in the form of errors in implementation. The proba-
bility for another round (in the case of direct reciprocity),
and information about the co-player (in the case of indirect
reciprocity), add further elements to the ecology of recipro-
cation.
Key index words: evolutionary game theory, replicator dynamics, coop-
eration, reputation, Prisoner’s Dilemma
1 Introduction
Among the rich variety of topics treated by John Maynard Smith, reciprocal
altruism takes a relatively narrow place. The most explicit treatment can
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be found in the last chapter, and the last appendix, of his seminal book on
’Evolution and the Theory of Games’ (Maynard Smith 1982), as well as in
a target paper written for Brain and Behavioral Science (Maynard Smith
1984). In a commentary to that paper, Selten and Hammerstein (1984)
criticised that Maynard Smith had rashly adopted the claim of Axelrod and
Hamilton (1981) that Tit For Tat, the reciprocal strategy par excellence, is
evolutionarily stable.
Indeed, John Maynard Smith did take some liberty with his own deﬁnition
of an evolutionarily stable strategy (or ESS). In that deﬁnition (see Maynard
Smith 1982), he had explicitly stated that for a strategy X to be an ESS,
it must (a) be a best reply to itself (i.e. a Nash equilibrium) and (b) if Y
were any alternative best reply, X should be a strictly better reply to Y than
Y itself. Indeed, if this second condition were not satisﬁed, Y could invade
through neutral drift.
As Maynard Smith explicitly showed in his appendix (Maynard Smith
1982), the strategy AllC (unconditional cooperation) is an alternative best
reply to TFT, and both strategies fare equally well against each other. Hence
TFT is no ESS for the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. This is not only a
mathematical pedantry. If unconditional altruists can spread, defectors can
eventually invade and ultimately take over. Moreover, Selten and Hammer-
stein (1984), just as Axelrod and Hamilton (1981), stressed rightly that if
players are only boundedly rational, an erroneous move in the iterated Pris-
oner’s Dilemma can lead to a long, payoﬀ-reducing vendetta between two
TFT players.
In this paper, we will investigate the interplay of defectors with condi-
tional and unconditional altruists, placing particular emphasis on the role of
errors. We shall analyse this in the context of evolutionary game dynamics
(see Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998) for both direct and indirect reciprocity,
i.e. for the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game against the same or against
varying co-players.
Humans are certainly supreme reciprocators. Most the examples of reciprocity-
based collaboration in other species have raised numerous objections and
failed to gain universal acceptance (Dugatkin 1998, Hammerstein 2004). All
other eusocial species achieving high levels of cooperation are based on kin-
selection, to a much larger extent than we are. Since John Maynard Smith
made a point in professing that ’for [him], the human applications of sociobi-
ology are peripheral’ (Maynard Smith 1988, Chapter 7), his relative neglect
of reciprocity may simply have been due to the fact that he saw little evidence
for it among species other than homo reciprocans.
In contrast, experimental economics increasingly highlights the fact that
the success of our species is based on our ability to treat non-relatives, and
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even complete strangers, as ’honorary relatives’ (to use a felicitous phrase,
cf Seabright 2004). We seem to have a special aptitude for reciprocal inter-
actions with our conspeciﬁcs. This tendency may well be a human universal
(Gintis et al 2003, Fehr and Fischbacher 2003).
Reciprocal interactions are based on the principle of just return (Axelrod
and Hamilton, 1981). It works if a helpful action, or a gift, is returned to the
donor by the recipient. Over a period of time, such mutual support can lead
to a beneﬁt for both parties involved (Trivers 1971). But next to this so-called
direct reciprocity, one also ﬁnds, at least among humans, instances of indirect
reciprocity: the return is provided, not by the recipient, but by a third party
(Trivers 1971, Alexander 1987, Lotem et al 1999, Wedekind and Milinski
2000, Wedekind and Braithwaite 2002). We note that strong reciprocity also
belongs in this context: humans tend to punish wrongdoers, even if this
involves a cost to themselves, and even if they are mere bystanders rather
than the victims of the wrongdoer. In fact, experiments have shown that
strong reciprocity and indirect reciprocity go a long way towards explaining
human behaviour in public goods games (Milinski et al 2002a,b, Fehr and
Fischbacher 2003).
It is clear that direct and indirect reciprocity share many common fea-
tures. In particular, the so-called folk theorem on repeated games applies
equally well to both cases (we will come back to this in the discussion).
However, there are also many subtle diﬀerences. In this paper, we propose
to compare the replicator dynamics in the two cases, restricting attention
to the three most basic strategies: to cooperate, to defect, or to discrimi-
nate. Needless to say, there are many other possible strategies, and some
play probably an important role. Nevertheless, we believe that the interplay
of these three particular rules captures an essential aspect of the evolution-
ary dynamics of cooperation, and of our instinct for reciprocation. Thus we
propose to investigate the logic of reciprocation by analysing the relationship
of the most basic conditional strategy (do whatever the co-player did), with
the two extreme unconditional strategies, those of undiscriminating altruism
and all-out defection.
2 The modelling background
All interactions which we consider involve two players, one in the role of the
donor, the other in the role of the recipient. The donor can confer a beneﬁt
b to the recipient, at a cost −c to the donor. Thus the donor can decide
whether to cooperate or to defect. We shall always assume 0 < c < b, and
use the terms ’donor’ and ’recipient’ even if the donor refuses to donate.
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We will consider repeated games. In the case of direct reciprocity, the
same two players interact round after round with each other. For convenience,
we shall assume that in each round, each of the two players is in both roles,
and that both players have to decide simultaneously, without knowing what
the other will do. In the case of indirect reciprocity, each player will be
matched with a diﬀerent co-player in each round. In fact, since we want to
keep the parallel as close as possible, we shall again assume that the player,
in each round, plays both roles (donor and recipient) and is matched against
two co-players. (Alternatively, we could imagine that the player is, in each
round, with the same probability in the role of the donor or the recipient.
This introduces no essential change, cf. Nowak and Sigmund 1998a)
Let us assume, as usual, that after every round another round can occur
with a constant probability w ≤ 1. We number the initial round by 0 and the
n-th iteration by n. The probability that there will be at least n iterations is
given by wn, the probability that there are exactly n iterations by wn(1−w).
In that case, the game will consist of exactly n + 1 rounds (the ﬁrst round,
and then n iterations). The length of the game will be a random variable,
its expectation value is 1(1−w)+ 2w(1−w)+ ...+nwn−1(1−w)+ ... which
sums up to (1− w)−1.
If we denote by A(n) the payoﬀ in the n-th round, we obtain in the case
w < 1 as expected value of the total payoﬀ the sum
+∞∑
n=0
wn(1− w)[A(0) + ...+ A(n)] (1)
which by using Abel’s summation formula is A(0) + wA(1) + .... Since all
A(n) are uniformly bounded, this sum always converges for w < 1 to some
value A(w). The average payoﬀ per round is given by
(1− w)A(w) = (1− w)2
+∞∑
n=0
wn[A(0) + ...+ A(n)]. (2)
It is often convenient to consider the limiting case w = 1. In this case,
there is always another round, the game consists of inﬁnitely many rounds
and the total payoﬀ
∑
nA(n) may diverge. It is convenient, instead, to
consider the average (over time) of the payoﬀ per round, i.e. the limit, for
n→ +∞, of
A(0) + ...+ A(n)
n+ 1
, (3)
provided it exists. The theorem of Frobenius implies that in this case, the
limit of the time averages is just limw→1(1− w)A(w).
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We shall consider the interaction of three strategies only. The cooper-
ator always decides to donate, when in the role of the donor; the defector
never donates; and the discriminator donates under conditions that will be
speciﬁed in the two cases of direct and indirect reciprocation considered be-
low. Cooperators and discriminators are also called undiscriminating and
discriminating altruists.
We consider a large, well-mixed population. The frequencies of the three
strategies (cooperator, defector, discriminator) are given by x, y and z,
respectively (with x + y + z = 1). With Px, Py and Pz we denote the
expected values for the total payoﬀ obtained by these strategies, and by
P¯ = xPx + yPy + zPz the average payoﬀ in the population. We shall assume
that the frequencies of the strategies change with time, such that more suc-
cessful strategies increase in frequency. For instance, we may assume that
from time to time, players can compare their payoﬀ with that of another
player chosen at random in the population, and imitate the strategy of that
player if it is more successful. If we assume that the probability for a switch
is proportional to the payoﬀ diﬀerence, the evolution of the frequencies of
the strategies in the population is given by the replicator equation
x˙ = x(Px − P¯ )
y˙ = y(Py − P¯ ) (4)
z˙ = z(Pz − P¯ ),
(see e.g. Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998). Many other dynamics show a sim-
ilar behaviour. We will frequently use the fact that the replicator equation
remains unchanged (in the simplex S3) if the same function is added to each
payoﬀ term, and by abuse of notation still design them with Px, Py, Pz and
P¯ . In particular, we can normalise the payoﬀ matrix by adding an appropri-
ate constant to each column. We recall that the Nash equilibria are exactly
those ﬁxed points which are saturated (i.e. if x = 0 then Px ≤ P¯ etc).
3 Direct reciprocity
The cooperator, defector and discriminator, for the case of direct recipro-
cation, are also known as AllC, AllD and TFT (Tit For Tat) player. The
latter cooperates in the ﬁrst round and then does whatever the co-player did
in the previous round.
AllD against AllD has payoﬀ A(n) = 0 in every round, so that A(w) = 0.
A TFT player against an AllD player earns A(0) = −c and, for n ≥ 1,
A(n) = 0, so that A(w) = −c, etc.
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The payoﬀ matrix for the three strategies AllC, AllD and TFT is, omit-
ting the factor (1− w)−1, (i.e. considering the payoﬀ per round)
M =
⎛
⎜⎝
b− c −c b− c
b 0 b(1− w)
b− c −c(1− w) b− c
⎞
⎟⎠ (5)
Let us normalise the corresponding replicator equation such that Py, the
payoﬀ for defectors, is 0. Then we obtain
Px = −c+ wbz Pz = Px + wcy. (6)
We note that Pz − P¯ = yg, with
g = w(b− c)z − c(1− w). (7)
On the edge with z = 0, AllD clearly wins. On the edge with x = 0, i.e.
in a population consisting of defectors and TFT-players, we have a bistable
dynamics. The unstable equilibrium is Fyz = (0, 1− zˆ, zˆ), with
zˆ =
(1− w)c
w(b− c)
. (8)
Since zˆ is small if w is close to 1, this means that a small TFT-cluster is able
to invade a population of defectors if w, i.e. the ’shadow of the future’ is
sufficiently large (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981). The edge y = 0 consists of
ﬁxed points only. Clearly, a population of AllC and TFT players will always
cooperate, and none of the two strategies is favoured. On the edge y = 0,
those points with z ≥ c/wb are Nash equilibria, and the others are not. To
see this, we have only to look at the sign of Py − P¯ , i.e. of Px = −c + wbz.
The other Nash equilibria are the corner y = 1 (defectors only) and Fyz.
In the interior of the simplex, there is no ﬁxed point. Indeed, we see that
Px = Py(= 0) holds for the points on the line g = 0, and that there, Pz
is positive. The segment with g = 0 consists of a single orbit parallel to
the edge z = 0, which converges to the saddle point Fyz and separates the
simplex into two parts.
It is easy to see that the function
V = x
1−w
w z−
1
w g (9)
is an invariant of motion.
In the case c < wb, the dynamics shows an interesting behaviour (see
Fig.1). In the absence of defectors, any mixture of TFT-players (i.e. dis-
criminating altruists) and AllC players (indiscriminating altruists) are in
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equilibrium, and we have to assume that random shocks send the system
up and down the defectors-free edge y = 0. If a random shock introduces
a small amount of defectors while z > c/wb, the defectors will forthwith be
eliminated. If the defectors are introduced while z < (1−w)c/w(b− c), they
will take over. But if the defectors are introduced in the ‘middle zone‘ where
c/wb > z > (1− w)c/w(b− c), (10)
the amount of defectors will ﬁrst increase, and then vanish. During the phase
of their invasion, they will exploit and eventually deplete the AllC players.
This is a kind of Pyrrhic victory: the defectors end up meeting mostly TFT-
players, and this will be their undoing.
Looking at it from the point of view of defectors, any invasion attempt
while z > zˆ is doomed to failure and will result in a state with y = 0 and
z > c/wb. The only hope for the defectors is to wait with the invasion
attempt until drift, i.e. a succession of random shocks, has sent the state,
along the edge y = 0, to the region where z < zˆ. This drift needs some
time. If the invasion attempts occur too often, the drift will never have the
time needed to lead into the zone which favors defectors. Thus the defectors
should not try too frequently to invade. In other terms, cooperators will be
safe only if invasion attemps by defectors are sufficiently frequent. If they are
too rare, a cooperative society might lose its immunity – random ﬂuctuations
may lead to a state with too few discriminators to repel an invasion attempt
by defectors. Let us mention in this context that we assume mutations to
be so rare that they do not lead to a deterministic drift term (otherwise we
would not be able to keep the treatment entirely analytic).
In order to deal with errors, it is convenient to use the results from Nowak-
Sigmund (1990), where the payoﬀs for stochastic reactive strategies are com-
puted. Each such strategy is given by a triplet (f, p, q), where f is the
probability to cooperate in round 0 and p resp. q are the probabilities to
cooperate after a cooperation resp. defection by the co-player in the previ-
ous round. In Nowak and Sigmund (1990) it is shown that if a player uses
strategy (f, p, q) against a co-player using (f ′, p′, q′), the payoﬀ is given by
−c(e+ wre′) + b(e′ + wr′e)
(1− w)(1− uw2)
(11)
where r := p − q, r′ := p′ − q′, u := rr′, e := (1 − w)f + wq and e′ :=
(1− w)f ′ + wq′.
AllC is given by (1, 1, 1), AllD by (0, 0, 0) and TFT is given by (1, 1, 0).
We will assume that an intended donation is mis-implemented with a prob-
ability ǫ, and an intended refusal with a probability kǫ, for some k ≥ 0.
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(It makes sense to distinguish between these two errors, and in particular
to keep the case k = 0 in mind.) Then the three strategies are given by
(1− ǫ, 1− ǫ, 1− ǫ), (kǫ, kǫ, kǫ) and (1− ǫ, 1− ǫ, kǫ), respectively.
Applying this formula to the strategies AllC, AllD and TFT , we obtain
a 3 × 3 payoﬀ matrix M which, at ﬁrst glance, looks somewhat daunting.
But it can be simpliﬁed considerably. We will use the fact that the replicator
dynamics on S3 is unchanged if we subtract, in each column of M , the diag-
onal from all elements. Up to the multiplicative factor c(1− (k+1)ǫ)/1−w,
the normalised matrix (which we still denote by M) is of the form
M =
⎛
⎜⎝
0 −1 δσ
1 0 −κσ
δ −κ 0
⎞
⎟⎠ (12)
where we used
δ := wǫ, κ := 1− w + wkǫ, σ :=
bθ − c
c− cθ
, θ = w(1− (k + 1)ǫ).
(13)
We note that P¯ = z(1 + σ)Pz. Using
Pz − P¯ = Pz[1− (1 + σ)z], (14)
we see that in the interior of S3, z˙ = 0 iﬀ g := 1−(1+σ)z vanishes. It is easy to
see that g = 0 deﬁnes an orbit connecting the ﬁxed points Fyz := (0, 1− zˆ, zˆ)
and Fxz := (1 − zˆ, 0, zˆ), where zˆ := (1 + σ)
−1. On the edge x = 0 there is
a bistable competition between defectors and discriminators, their basins of
attraction separated by Fyz. On the edge y = 0 there is a stable coexistence
between the discriminators and the undiscriminating altruists at the point
Fxz. On the edge z = 0 the defectors dominate the undiscriminating altruists.
In the interior of S3 we obtain an invariant of motion
V := xAyBzC [1− (1 + σ)z] (15)
with A = κ/θ, B = δ/θ and C = −1/θ (note that A+B + C + 1 = 0).
The interior ﬁxed point is
F = (κσ, δσ, 1)
1
1 + σ(κ+ δ)
. (16)
The dynamics is shown in Fig.2. There is a horizontal orbit on the line
with z = zˆ, connecting the ﬁxed points Fxz and Fyz (the latter is a Nash
equilibrium). Below this line, all orbits converge to y = 1, the defectors win.
The part above the line is ﬁlled with periodic orbits surrounding the unique
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ﬁxed point: they correspond to the constant level curves of the invariant of
motion V given by (15). The time averages correspond to the values at the
ﬁxed point F . This ﬁxed point is stable, but not asymptotically stable. We
note that the amount of defectors ( whose time average corresponds to δσ)
can be made arbitrarily small if the error rate is sufficiently reduced. On the
other hand, the basin of attraction of the defectors can be arbitrarily small
if ǫ is sufficiently small and w sufficiently close to 1.
For w = 1 we obtain as payoﬀ matrix, up to the multiplicative factor
c(1− (k + 1)ǫ),
M =
⎛
⎜⎝
0 −1 β
1 0 −kβ
ǫ −kǫ 0
⎞
⎟⎠ (17)
where
β :=
1
c
(
b− c
1 + k
− ǫb). (18)
(Recall that, using Frobenius, we have to multiply all values with the factor
1−w in order to obtain the average payoﬀ per round.) If k > 0 (i.e. if there
is a positive probability that an intended refusal results in a donation), the
dynamics is the same as in Fig 2, the z-coordinate of the separatrix is
zˆ :=
c
b− c
(
(k + 1)ǫ
1− (k + 1)ǫ
). (19)
If ǫ→ 0 the separatrix merges with z = 0 and we obtain a system whose
payoﬀ matrix is
M =
⎛
⎜⎝
0 −c (b− c)/(1 + k)
c 0 −k(b− c)/(1 + k)
0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠ (20)
This is a rock-paper-scissors game: AllD is outcompeted by TFT , which
is outcompeted by AllC, which is outcompeted by AllD in turn. The unique
ﬁxed point in the interior of S3 is F = (k(b−c)/(k+1)b, (b−c)/(k+1)b, c/b).
We conclude that for k > 0 (positive probability that an intended refusal
turns into a donation), the replicator dynamics is as shown in Fig 3.
If, on the other hand, we ﬁrst consider the limiting case ǫ = 0 (with
w < 1), we obtain the dynamics shown in Figure 1. If we then consider the
limit case w = 1, we obtain Fig 4. We note that the passages to the limit
w = 1 and ǫ = 0 do not commute.
Traditionally, it is assumed in most treatments of indirect reciprocity
that only intended donations are mis-implemented, not intended defections
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(Panchanathan and Boyd 2003, Fishman 2003, Brandt and Sigmund 2004).
This is quite in line with everyday experience. We note that in Fishman
(2003), the failure of an intended donation is not due to an error, but to a lack
of resources. Such a lack of resources can occur occasionally, by pure chance,
and has the same eﬀects as an error: it results in an unintended defection. In
indirect reciprocity, it turns out that if we assume that intended defections
also fail, the resulting dynamics is not appreciably diﬀerent. Interestingly,
however, it makes a diﬀerence in direct reciprocity, for the passage to the
limit w = 1.
To see this, let us assume that k = 0. In the limiting case w = 1, the
payoﬀ matrix is given, up to the factor c(1− ǫ), by
M =
⎛
⎜⎝
0 −1 β
1 0 0
ǫ 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠ (21)
This yields a completely diﬀerent picture. The edge x = 0 consists of ﬁxed
points. Intuitively, this is clear: errors between two TFT players will even-
tually lead to mutual defection, and this can never be redressed by another
error. Thus their average payoﬀ per round will be 0. The ﬁxed points with
z ≤ z¯ are Nash equilibria, where
z¯ = c/b(1− ǫ). (22)
The dynamics looks as in Fig 5, which is an intriguing mirror-image of Fig
1. Finally, if we let ǫ→ 0, we obtain Fig 6 as a mirror image of Fig 4.
A very interesting related paper has recently been submitted (Imhof et
al, 2005). It also studies, in the context of direct reciprocity, the interplay
of AllC, AllD and TFT. Instead of assuming errors, it imposes a cost of
complexity to the TFT strategy. The payoﬀ matrix, therefore, is
M =
⎛
⎜⎝
b− c −c b− c
b 0 b(1− w)
b− c− v −c(1− w)− v b− c− v
⎞
⎟⎠ (23)
where v > 0 is a small number corresponding to an extra cost for using a
conditional strategy, rather than an unconditional one. The edge y = 0, now,
consists of an orbit leading from z = 1 to x = 1: TFT is dominated by AllC.
The dynamics on the other edges is as before. There exists a unique ﬁxed
point F in the interior of S3:
F := (1−
v
cw
−
c
bw
,
v
cw
,
c
bw
). (24)
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A simple computation shows that the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of the
replicator equation, at the point F , are complex conjugate and have positive
real part. Hence F is unstable, and in the vicinity the orbits spiral out-
ward, clockwise. Since F is a Nash equilibrium, and y = 1 is also a Nash
equilibrium, it follows by the odd number theorem (see e.g. Hofbauer and
Sigmund, 1998) that there must exist a third Nash equilibrium, which nec-
essarily must be Fyz. This point is saturated, and hence a saddle. There
must be an orbit with F as α-limit and Fyz as ω-limit. All other orbits in
the interior of S3 converge to y = 1, so that the defectors win (see Fig.7).
This follows easily from Zeeman (1980). As shown numerically in Imhof et
al (2005), the addition of a mutation term introduces a limit cycle. The gist
of this paper discusses the case of a ﬁnite population and shows that the
corresponding stochastic process spends most of its time in the vicinity of
the TFT corner, provided the population is sufficiently large, the number of
rounds sufficiently high and the mutation rate sufficiently small. It would
be of considerable interest to ﬁnd out whether a corresponding results holds
if players are not penalised by a cost of complexity but are liable to make
errors. We stress that the bifurcation due to the cost of complexity v is quite
diﬀerent from the bifurcation due to the error probability ǫ, although in both
cases the limit equilibrium is (1− c/bw, 0, c/bw).
4 Indirect reciprocity
Two of the main diﬀerences between direct and indirect reciprocation are the
following.
(1) The Tit For Tat strategy discriminates according to what happened
in the previous round. There are two distinct ways of translating this in the
context of indirect reciprocity (see also Boyd and Richerson 1989). Players
can base their decision on what happened to themselves in the previous
round; alternatively, they can base their decision on what their co-player did
in the previous round. Roughly speaking, players can either be aﬀected by
a diﬀuse feeling of indebtedness (’Somebody helped me, I feel elated and
therefore will help the next person’), or else, they can be moved by a feeling
of appreciation (’My co-player did a noble thing, not to me but to a third
party, and I will now help my co-player in turn’). In both cases, some general
feeling of gratitude seems at work.
In one case, A gives to B and therefore B gives to C. In the other case, A
gives to B and therefore C gives to A (see Fig 8). In one case, the discrimi-
nator received a beneﬁt, and thanks a person who did not help him. In the
other case, the discriminator rewards a benefactor – but for an action that
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did not beneﬁt him.
Interestingly, both factors seem to show up in economic experiments (cf
our remarks at the end of this section). But in the theoretical models con-
sidered so far, rewarding works fairly well and thanking not at all.
(2) The two players engaged in direct reciprocation experience in par-
allel the same number of rounds. By contrast, the histories of two players
interacting via indirect reciprocity intersect only once, and thus each has a
diﬀerent numbering of his rounds: a donor in the ﬁrst round may be matched
with a recipient who has reached her ﬁfth round, etc.
One more remark on the patterns of interaction between the players. In a
more sophisticated direct reciprocity model, we could assume that the players
alternate, either regularly or randomly, as donor and recipient, rather than
acting simultaneously (Nowak and Sigmund 1994, Frean 1994). Similarly,
in a less sophisticated model of indirect reciprocity, we could assume that
all players start at the same time and that their rounds are synchronised
(Nowak and Sigmund 1998b, Panchanathan and Boyd 2003, Fishman 2003,
Ohtsuki and Iwasa 2004). This does not agree, however, with the continuous
replicator dynamics, which is based on the assumption that generations blend
into each other, or that learning occurs continuously. In fact, a synchronous
model would better ﬁt with a diﬀerence equation.
A high value for w, i.e. a large number of rounds, is less plausible with
indirect than with direct reciprocity, since in a realistically small population,
players experiencing many rounds would necessarily have to interact numer-
ous times with the same partner, and hence be engaged in direct reciprocity.
Nevertheless, the limiting case of w → 1 has been considered by some au-
thors (eg Ohtsuki and Iwasa 2004). We shall see that in our model, setting
w = 1 does not change much.
We will consider a continuous entry model, as in Brandt and Sigmund
(2005). Players enter a large population one by one, interact asynchronously
with diﬀerent players at random times, and exit. Since we assume that the
population is large, its composition will change only slowly, so that it is
stationary during an individual’s life-time.
We consider the case that C gives A, i.e. that discriminators are mo-
tivated to reward players, and give if their co-player gave in the previous
round. Again, we denote by ǫ the probability of not implementing an in-
tended donation.
Let q be the probability that a player knows (either through direct obser-
vation or via gossip) what a randomly chosen co-player did in the previous
round. Furthermore, let us posit that discriminators are trustful in the sense
that if they have no information, they assume that their recipient gave help
in the previous round. With h we denote the frequency of players with a
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good reputation (i.e. having given in their previous round). It is easy to see
that h = ǫ¯(x+ z(1− q + qh)), so that we obtain
h =
ǫ¯(x+ (1− q)z)
1− ǫ¯qz
. (25)
The payoﬀ in round n (with n ≥ 1) for an indiscriminate altruist is
Px(n) = −cǫ¯+ bǫ¯[x+ z[(1− q) + ǫ¯q]]. (26)
Indeed, such a player always tries to donate, at a cost −c (this succeeds with
probability ǫ¯). On the other hand, the player is the object of an intended
donation if the co-player who donates is either an unconditional cooperator
(probabilty x) or a discriminator (probability y) who either does not know
the player’s reputation (probability 1−q) or else knows the reputation (prob-
ability q), and that reputation is good (probability ǫ¯, because it can only be
bad if the player, an unconditional altruist, made a mistake in the previous
round). The beneﬁt resulting from an intended donation is bǫ¯, because the
donation can fail with probability ǫ. Similarly, the payoﬀ for a defector is
Py(n) = bǫ¯[x+ (1− q)z], (27)
and for a discriminator which we call A, it is
Pz(n) = −cǫ¯(1− q + qh) + bǫ¯[x+ z[(1− q) + ǫ¯q(1− q + qh)]]. (28)
The second term in the sum is (up to the expected beneﬁt bǫ¯) just the
probability that the co-player intends to make a donation to player A. This
happens either if the player is an unconditional altruist (probability x), or if
he is a discriminator (probability z) who either does not know the reputation
of A (probability 1−q) or else knows the reputation (probability q), and this
reputation is good. The reputation of A is good if in the previous round, A
intended to donate (either because A did not know the co-player’s reputation
or else because that reputation was good, an event whose probability is h),
and if moreover A succeeded in the intended donation (probability ǫ¯).
A straightforward computation shows that
Pz(n)− Py(n) = [Px(n)− Py(n)](1− q + qh). (29)
The same relation holds for the ﬁrst round, although the payoﬀs for the ﬁrst
round are slightly diﬀerent: Px(0) = −cǫ¯+ bǫ¯(x+ z), Py(0) = bǫ¯(x+ z) and
Pz(0) = −cǫ¯[(1 − q) + qh] + bǫ¯(x + z). Hence the total payoﬀ values Px, Py
and Pz also satisfy
Pz − Py = [Px − Py](1− q + qh). (30)
13
Clearly Px(n)−Py(n) = ǫ¯(−c+bǫ¯qz) (for n ≥ 1) and Px(0)−Py(0) = −cǫ¯.
Thus if w = 1 the payoﬀ values per round satisfy
Px − Py = ǫ¯(−c+ bǫ¯qz) (31)
and for w < 1,
Px − Py = ǫ¯(−c+ wbǫ¯qz). (32)
If we normalise by setting Py = 0 then, up to the factor ǫ¯, we obtain
Px = f Pz = f(1− q + qh) (33)
where f = −c+ wbǫ¯qz.
Let us ﬁrst consider the corresponding replicator equation without the
common factor f . Since h = ǫ¯(x+ (1− q)z)/(1− ǫ¯qz), this equation has the
same orbits as the equation with
Px = 1− ǫ¯qz, Pz = 1− q + ǫ¯qx. (34)
If q < 1 and ǫ > 0, we have 0 = Py < Pz < Px and hence all orbits in S3
converge to x = 1, with the exception of the edge x = 0. An invariant of
motion is given by V = zxq−1y−ǫq.
If ǫ = 0 (no errors), the edge y = 0 consists of ﬁxed points and the
invariant of motion is V = zxq−1. If q = 1 (full information about the co-
players) the edge x = 0 consists of ﬁxed points and the invariant of motion
is V = zy−ǫ.
Let us now consider the replicator dynamics for (33).
If q < c/wbǫ¯ then f is negative for all values of z between 0 and 1, and
hence on all of S3. Multiplication with f corresponds thus to a time-reversal.
This means that the undiscriminating altruists are dominated by both the
discriminators and the defectors, while the discriminators are dominated by
the defectors. All orbits in the interior of the simplex lead from x = 1
(undiscriminating altruists only) to y = 1 (defectors only). This means that
if the probability q to know the co-players past is too small (i.e. if there
is not much scope for reputation), cooperation cannot evolve, a well-known
result from Nowak and Sigmund (1998a) (see Fig. 9).
If q > c/wbǫ¯, then the line z = c/wbqǫ¯ intersects the interior of the
simplex S3 and deﬁnes a segment of ﬁxed points. Indeed, on that line, 0 =
Py = Px = Pz. These ﬁxed points are all Nash equilibria. In the simplex
S3, all orbits lie on the same curves as with (34), but the orientation has not
changed in the region with z > c/wbqǫ¯ (see Fig 10).
This means in particular that the mixture of discriminating and undis-
criminating altruists given by z = c/wbqǫ¯ and y = 0 corresponds to a ﬁxed
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point of the replicator dynamics. A cooperative population of two types of
altruists can exist, if the average level of information within the population
is sufficiently high. We note that this equilibrium is stable. However, it is
not asymptotically stable, since it belongs to a segment of ﬁxed points.
The dynamic behaviour in the vicinity of the segment of Nash equilibria is
interesting. One part of the segment is transversally stable, in the sense that
small perturbations away from the segment are counteracted by the dynam-
ics. In the other part, small perturbations are ampliﬁed by the dynamics. A
small deviation to higher z-values will lead, ﬁrst to an increase and then to
a decrease of discriminators, and thus eventually back to the stable part of
the segment. By contrast, in the unstable part of the ﬁxed points segment,
a small deviation to lower z-values leads to the ﬁxation of defectors.
In the limiting case ǫ = 0 (no errors), the edge y = 0 consists of ﬁxed
points, of which those with z ≥ c/wbq are Nash equilibria. The line with
z = c/wbq consists of ﬁxed points, too. Below this line, all orbits converge to
y = 1. Above the line, each orbit converges to a Nash equilibrium on y = 0.
(see Fig. 11).
In the limiting case q = 1 (full information) the edge x = 0 consists of
ﬁxed points, of which those with z < c/wbǫ¯ are Nash equilibria. The line with
z = c/wbǫ¯ consists of ﬁxed points which are all stable. Hence the dynamics
is as shown in Fig 12.
If both q = 1 and ǫ = 0 the edges x = 0 and y = 0 both consist of ﬁxed
points. In the interior of S3, all orbits remain on parallels to the z = 0 edge.
Those with z > c/wb point from left to right (the defectors vanish), while
those with z < c/wb point from right to left (the undiscriminating altruists
vanish). Again, the line z = c/wb consists of Nash equilibria. The dynamics
is shown in Fig 13.
As an aside, let us turn to previous models of indirect reciprocity which
were based on the assumption that all players experience their rounds in a
synchronised way. In the case of no errors and a ﬁxed number of rounds,
this leads to a dynamics as in Fig. 1. Without errors and with a constant
probability w < 1 for another round we obtain a dynamics like in Fig. 11
(Nowak and Sigmund 1989b). With errors and a constant probability w < 1
for another round, the dynamics looks as in Fig 10 (Panchanathan and Boyd
2003). With errors and a number of rounds which is ﬁxed in advance or
Poisson distributed, the dynamics is bistable and displays an attractor con-
sisting of a stable mixture of discriminating and undiscriminating altruists,
as shown in Fig 14 (Fishman 2003, Brandt and Sigmund 2004). Let us note
that synchronised games can easily be set up in experiments, but they seem
unlikely to occur under natural circumstances.
Finally, let us brieﬂy consider the case when players are motivated by a
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general feeling of indebtedness, and discriminators decide to give whenever
they have received support in the previous round. If we denote by h the
probability that a player has received support in the previous round, we see
that h = ǫ¯(x+ hz).
In round n the payoﬀ values for unconditional altruists, defectors and
discriminators are Px(n) = −cǫ¯+ hb, Py(n) = hb and Pz(n) = −chǫ¯+ hb. If
we assume that a discriminator, in the ﬁrst round, always donates, we get
Pz(0) = −cǫ¯+bh. After normalising the total payoﬀ values such that Py = 0,
we obtain, up to the factor (1− w)−1,
Px = −cǫ¯, Pz = Px[1− w(1− h)]. (35)
The dynamics looks as in Fig 9: the defector’s corner with y = 1 is a
global attractor. This still holds if the error rates are modiﬁed, or if one
assumes that the discriminators defect in the ﬁrst round, etc. In particular,
letting ǫ → 0 or w → 1 changes nothing. It is all the more surprising that
some experiments (and, indeed, everyday introspection) show that indirect
reciprocation based on a generalised feeling of indebtedness is not rare (En-
gelmann and Fischbacher, 2002, Dufenberg et al 2001). To the best of our
knowledge, a theoretical explanation for this is still lacking (cf Boyd and
Richerson 1989).
5 Discussion
Direct and indirect reciprocation are obviously closely related. For instance,
Nowak and Sigmund (1998b) pointed out that the discriminating strategy
used in their treatment of indirect reciprocity is nothing but the ’Observer
TFT’ discussed by Pollock and Dugatkin (1992) in the context of the iter-
ated Prisoner’s Dilemma. There is a line of papers by economists, most of
it antedating the work by evolutionary biologists, which discusses indirect
reciprocation in populations of rational players (see e.g. Rosenthal 1979,
Kandori 1992, Ellison 1994). In particular, the so-called folk theorem on
repeated games states that every feasible pair of payoﬀ values for the two
players is obtainable by strategies in equilibrium (i.e. such that no player
has an incentive to deviate). It must only be assumed that (a) the payoﬀ
is larger than the security level that players can guarantee themselves (in
our case, this is 0), and (b) that the probability for another round is suffi-
ciently large (see e.g. Fudenberg and Maskin 1986). The equilibrium can be
achieved by so-called ’trigger strategies’ which switch to defection as soon
as the other player defects. Intuitively, it makes no sense to exploit the co-
player in one round if one thereby forfeits all chances for mutual cooperation
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in further rounds. The argument works for direct as well as for indirect
reciprocation. The diﬀerence between personal enforcement, in the former
case, and community enforcement, in the latter, is irrelevant to the sequence
of payoﬀs encountered by an individual player. The folk theorem assumes
rational players having full information, but it can be considerably extended.
In both direct and indirect reciprocity, the presence of unconditional al-
truists weakens the stability of the cooperation. Although the dynamics in
Figs. 2 and 10 look very diﬀerent, in each case the defector’s corner y = 1
has a basin of attraction which can, and will, be ultimatively reached if the
population is subject to arbitrarily small random shocks for a sufficiently long
time. As long as this is not the case, the three strategies coexist in a stable,
but not in an asymptotically stable way. In one case, periodic oscillations
around the Nash equilibrium can increase, and in the other case, the state
can wander along a continuum of Nash equilibria, until the defector’s basin
is threateningly close.
There are devices leading out of this fundamental unstability, of course.
One variation working for both direct and indirect reciprocity is provided by
the concept of ’good standing’ (Sugden 1986). A player who cooperates is
in good standing. A player failing to donate to a recipient in good standing
will acquire a ’bad standing’. But a player refusing to donate to a player in
bad standing will keep a good standing. Essentially, this means that discrim-
inators have to distinguish between justiﬁed and unjustiﬁed defections. The
corresponding strategy in the context of direct reciprocity is called Contrite
TFT, in the context of indirect reciprocity ’standing strategy’. In both cases,
the strategy (or family of strategies, to be precise) is more stable than the
discriminating strategy we have considered in this paper (see e.g. Boerlijst
et al 1997, Leimar and Hammerstein 2001, Panchanathan and Boyd 2003).
On the other hand, it requires higher cognitive capabilities, and suﬀers from
errors in perception (rather than implementation). Experimental evidence
for the standing strategy seems to be disappointing (Milinski et al 2001).
There are other ways of boosting the stability of reciprocation. For in-
stance, the so-called Pavlov strategy (which prescribes to donate if both
players, in the previous round, made the same decision) can lead to stable
cooperation in direct reciprocation whenever b > 2c (Fudenberg and Maskin
1990, Nowak and Sigmund 1993). In indirect reciprocation, the assumption
that the social information of each player grows during his or her life-time can
also lead to an asymptotically stable mixture of discriminating and undis-
criminating altruists (Brandt and Sigmund, 2005).
To return to John Maynard Smith, let us note that the last chapter of
’The major transitions in evolution’ (Maynard Smith and Szathmary, 1997)
discusses the evolution of human cooperation between non-relatives by plac-
17
ing particular emphasis on the social contract and the public goods game. It
can be argued that indirect reciprocity occupies a place in between between
direct reciprocity and public goods games (see also Milinski et al 2002a,b, and
Panchanathan and Boyd 2004). It describes interactions between two players
only (donor and recipient), but it involves reputation, and hence communica-
tion, acting within a larger group. Moreover, like the social contract, indirect
reciprocity requires at least a rudimentary form of a theory of mind. Indeed,
emphaty is clearly required for a bystander to form a moral judgement about
an action taking place between two other players. Reputation also plays an
essential role in the theory proposed by Sigmund et al (2001) to explain the
role of punishment in public goods games. Thus reciprocation, both direct
and indirect, constitutes certainly an important element for understanding
the last of the major transitions on the list of John Maynard Smith, the one
that led to human cooperation.
Acknowledgement: We wish to thank Lorens Imhof and Martin A. Nowak
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7 Figure Captions
Figure 1: The replicator dynamics of direct reciprocity in the absence of
errors, assuming a constant probability w < 1 for a further round. Here and
in the other ﬁgures, full circles correspond to stable ﬁxed points, and empty
circles to unstable ﬁxed points (stability being understood in the sense of
Lyapunov: all close-by states remain close-by). We note that ﬁxed points
that are stable are Nash equilibria, but that the converse does not hold.
The same dynamics shows up in the case of indirect reciprocity with a ﬁxed
number of synchronous rounds and no errors (ǫ = 0).
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Figure 2: The replicator dynamics of direct reciprocity with errors in imple-
mentation (i.e. ǫ > 0), for w < 1.
Figure 3: The replicator dynamics of direct reciprocity, with errors in imple-
mentation, for w = 1 (the inﬁnitely iterated game).
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Figure 4: The replicator dynamics of direct reciprocity, in the absence of
errors, i.e. ǫ = 0, for w = 1.
Figure 5: The replicator dynamics of direct reciprocity, if only donations are
mis-implemented, for w < 1.
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Figure 6: The replicator dynamics of direct reciprocity if only donations are
mis-implemented, for w = 1.
Figure 7: The replicator dynamics of direct reciprocity if there is a cost to
complexity. On the edge y = 0, the discriminators are dominated by the
unconditional altruists.
24
Figure 8: Two approaches to indirect reciprocity. If A gives to B, C may
either decide to reward A or expect help from B.
Figure 9: The replicator dynamics of indirect reciprocity for ǫ > 0 if q, the
information about the co-player’s last move, is small. The same dynam-
ics holds if discriminators are expected to donate whenever they received a
donation in the previous round.
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Figure 10: The replicator dynamics of indirect reciprocity for ǫ > 0 if q,
the information about the co-player’s last move, is sufficiently large. The
dynamics looks the same if one assumes synchronous rounds, and w < 1.
Figure 11: The replicator dynamics of indirect reciprocity for ǫ = 0 (no
errors) if q < 1 but sufficiently large. The dynamics looks the same if one
assumes synchronous rounds, ǫ = 0, and w < 1.
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Figure 12: The replicator dynamics of indirect reciprocity if ǫ > 0 and q = 1.
Figure 13: The replicator dynamics of indirect reciprocity if ǫ = 0 and q = 1.
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Figure 14: The replicator dynamics of indirect reciprocity if one assumes
synchronous rounds, ǫ > 0, and a number of rounds which is ﬁxed, or Poisson
distributed.
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